THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

MIGRATION INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENT

BOLSTER INCLUSION TO FOSTER DEVELOPMENT
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IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

This publication has been issued without formal editing by IOM.
Moroccan youth during an internship supported by the YMED project. © IOM 2019 / Amine OULMAKI
For many decades the relationship between migration and development has been analysed, studied and discussed by migration practitioners, but not integrated into the development dialogue, strategies and frameworks. Only recently is migration understood as an inherent aspect of social change in international policy. The inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and the Sustainable Development Goals is a major step in this direction.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recognizes the reciprocal relationship between migration and development. Thanks to the continued support of and collaboration with the Italian Government, IOM implements a wide range of programs and projects in Italy and beyond. Our joint work on migration and development has been consistent over the years, and our priorities and approaches closely aligned. The support of the Italian Government has been fundamental in promoting activities that empower migrants individually and collectively in Italy and facilitate their transnational engagement in development processes and entrepreneurship.

This publication, the first volume of a series, aims at distilling lessons learned from such approaches and setting the stage for a renewed public debate on migration and development. One of the key lessons learned is that
migrants, new generations of Italians and diasporas can effectively become agents of social change when structural conditions are in place to favour their transnational engagement. This entails, necessarily, their full participation in a more cohesive and multicultural Italian society.

We are confident that the approaches, lessons learned, and experiences discussed in this publication will inspire international cooperation policy and practice and contribute to the global debate on migration and development.

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Participants to the course Migrant Associations for Co-Development (A.Mi.CO.), Padova (Italy).

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In the last years, migration has become an increasingly visible issue even though the global proportion of international migrants has been stable for decades at around 3 per cent of the world population. Along with such visibility, the perceptions surrounding migration have been increasingly polarized.

In the past few years, and especially since 2015, migration has been more and more frequently described through narratives of crisis, invasion, or as a problem to be solved. Migration has become a ‘hot topic’ at the centre of the political arena of many countries and is hardly ever discussed in a neutral way.

The former begs the question about what migration is. Beyond the prevalent polarized discourse, which usually conceives of migration as a South-North phenomenon, and of migrants as a ‘visible’ and ‘disturbing’ category of population, migration is actually difficult to define. After all, are the so-called ‘expats’ not migrants as well? Is a British doctor living in the United States not a migrant? Yes, they are migrants too. The concept of migration encompasses a myriad of realities and experiences, which often contrast with perceptions based on dichotomies deeply rooted in the current migration discourse that distinguish between countries of origin of the global
South and countries of destination of the global North, the former usually classified as developing countries and the latter as developed.

If the term migration can apply to multiple situations, the predominant perceptions and discourses around these phenomena play a significant role in shaping migrants’ experiences. As such, migration is not only a reality (the movement of people), but it is also a social construct, which implies that the reality affects and is affected by the narrative that surrounds it. Indeed, migration perceptions affect the policies that aim to govern it and have a direct impact on migrants’ lives and on their capacity to act upon their environment.

Acknowledging migration as a social construct, this publication explores how it relates to development. This is certainly not a novel interrogation, but the elevation of migration as an issue of international policy and decades of Migration and Development practice merit the question.

A historical overview of the understanding of the link between migration and development throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, shows how the latter has been shifting alternatively from optimistic (until the early 1970s) to pessimistic views (between 1970s and the 1990s). However, optimistic views seem to predominate since the 1990s.

Overall, optimistic views rooted in neoclassical economics tend to conceive of migrants as rational market actors who optimize their resources or value through migration, typically depicted as a flow from underdeveloped countries of origin to more developed destination countries. Migration decisions and the choice of the destination are explained as the result of utility calculations. Moreover, building on an understanding of development as a linear path from tradition to modernity, the underdevelopment of Southern countries is usually explained in terms of lack of capital and knowledge, and migrants are therefore portrayed as agents that could facilitate the circulation of both.
From the 1970s onwards development practice was increasingly criticized, as both Eastern and Western policies had failed to deliver: Pessimistic approaches to the so-called ‘Migration and Development nexus’, depicted migration as a means to escape from structural poverty, rather than a strategy to maximize income and drive development, and put forward the issue of ‘brain drain’, claiming that migrants are typically those better off and, therefore, migration deprives the countries of origin from their most skilled population to the benefit of rich countries. Overall, pessimistic approaches portrayed the link between migration and development negatively, as leading to a vicious circle in which underdeveloped countries are constantly impoverished to the benefit of richer countries of destination.

Both, optimistic and pessimistic approaches disregarded the social, political or cultural considerations that are part of the dynamics underlying migration, considering migrants as passive actors subjected to broader global economic considerations. Eventually, the recognition of the importance of overcoming simplistic econometric explanations led to more elaborated theories of migration, as well as more articulated explanations of the complex ways in which it is linked to development.

Among these theories, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), for instance, explained migration as a household risk-sharing strategy, combining different activities to secure, increase and preserve the household’s livelihood. Similarly, the recognition of the fact that migrants may develop multiple loyalties led to the acknowledgement of migrants’ transnational ties and networks. Moreover, the acknowledgement of social dynamics at the household, local and transnational level allowed overcoming migrants’ representation as passive actors simply responding to the economic dynamics of the flow or distribution of capital. It allowed recognizing both migrants’ agency, that is, the ability to overcome constraints and potentially reshape existing structures, and migrants’ aspirations, to provide broader explanations of why people decide to move. Finally, the appreciation of social dynamics allowed understanding that the link between migration and development partially lies on peoples’ possibilities or opportunities to
acquire the means to move and, therefore, that peoples’ aspirations and capabilities are closely related.

Against such historical background, the publication explores how the link between Migration and Development as a field of policy and practice became increasingly important in the international arena, as demonstrated by different international fora dedicated to exploring the issue. The recognition of migration as an international policy issue contributed to shaping an international agenda focused on the search for solutions to maximize migration’s developmental impacts. Strategies aimed at mobilizing migrants’ resources focusing on remittances, entrepreneurship, and diaspora engagement, based on the premise that through effective policies migrants’ agency can be strengthened to eventually benefit their country of origin.
However, the risk of oversimplification in the assumption that policy and practice based on migrant resource mobilization constitute directly and automatically the link between migration and development is explored. It is argued that use of remittances to afford health or education services, for instance, raises the question of shifting states’ responsibilities to provide for such services to migrants, and the potential inequalities that may result thereof. Similarly, it is recognized that while many migrants or return migrants become entrepreneurs, their enterprises are not always successful or necessarily translate into job creation; and while some migrants gather into diaspora or other types of associations which may implement development projects in the countries of origin, this does not entail that all migrants are organized or have the capacities to design and implement such development initiatives.

As such, it is recognized that the link between migration and development is rather complex, that migrants are neither necessarily, nor automatically, agents of development, and that the link between migration and development does not depend only on what migrants can do for development.

Migration is here understood as a phenomenon that determines and is determined by issues and dynamics at the individual, household, local, national (for instance policy framework) and international levels, including geopolitical realities, which affect individuals’ aspirations to migrate and the outcomes of migration. Similarly, migration experiences shape household, local, national and international dynamics. This perspective allows acknowledging that not only can migration impact development, but also that different policies, including those related to development affect migration patterns and outcomes. Therefore, migration can be all at once a driver of development (for example bringing new social security contributors to an ageing society); a consequence of development (for instance a coping strategy in response to the negative impacts of sectoral policies such as trade, infrastructure and the like on people’s livelihoods); and an inherent aspect of development (for example when embedded in regional economic integration dynamics aimed at boosting economic growth in free circulation zones). The Migration and Development nexus entails that migration affects the outcomes of
sectoral (development) policies, as much as sectoral (development) policies affect migration dynamics, and this mutual relationship materializes in positive or negative ways.

In this framework, integration is a key aspect of the Migration and Development nexus. Integration policies empower migrants to be part of their host society, to exert their agency (the capacity to act) and access the same opportunities than their neighbours on an equal foot.

Migrants’ access to resources, experience, skills and networks is strongly influenced by integration policies. In the absence of policies enabling migrants to communicate, use and develop their skills, influence the society where they live, feel at home and protected, it is difficult to expect that migrants’ ‘development’ projects, when they exist, are successful or effective, or to envisage a significant impact of migration on the welfare of the host country.

Recognizing the importance of integration sheds a new light on approaches based on the mobilization of migrants’ resources, emphasizing the conditions for success. Even if not all migrants are necessarily willing or capable to engage in development, integration is nonetheless a key precondition for the success of those who intend to do so.

Italy has been a leading actor in the global Migration and Development agenda and has adopted such a comprehensive approach to Migration and Development, recognizing the importance of enhancing migrants’ capabilities not only in the countries of origin, but also during their stay in Italy.

The Italian approach to Migration and Development has aimed at engaging migrants and transnational communities in development processes by understanding their characteristics, needs, motivations and capabilities as well as reaching out to them. The Italian approach has also supported the
creation of enabling conditions to develop migrants’ and their organizations’ full potential in the societies that they bridge and strived to empower transnational communities, through capacity-building, funding or technical support to those willing to engage in development activities.

Among the flagship programmes supported by Italy since the early 2000s the different Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and Migration for Development in Latin America (MIDLA) programmes provide tailor-made capacity-building opportunities to engage, enable and empower key migrant individuals and associations to ultimately enhance their transnational impact. More recently, this approach has materialized into programmes such as MigraVenture and Associazioni Migranti per il Co-sviluppo (A.MI.CO.) which aim at enhancing or scaling up migrants’ entrepreneurial and small-scale development initiatives through targeted support and capacity-building.

In conclusion, the Italian approach to Migration and Development has recognized integration as a fundamental part in the equation, showing the benefits of adopting systemic, programmatic and policy approaches that take these three areas simultaneously into consideration.

This can be done in several ways. Firstly, the acknowledgement that migrants are distinct individuals with diverse profiles implies the need for diversified support tools rather than universal solutions and ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches. Tailor-made strategies which recognize, and target people’s different profiles, capacities and aspirations are much more likely to have significant positive impacts than approaches that consider migrants as a homogeneous category of population.

Secondly, it is necessary to recognize, from a policy perspective, the intimate relationship between migration and the dynamics governed by other policy sectors. This implies integrating migration into other sectoral policies, both locally and nationally, as opposed to addressing migration in an isolated manner.
Thirdly, such a holistic approach to migration should be supported with the relevant resources. Tailor-made approaches may seem more expensive than ‘universal’ approaches; however, the return on investment is higher in terms of the impact that tailor-made approaches are likely to produce.

Finally, promoting partnerships is a key aspect of the Migration – Integration – Development equation. Migration’s complexity and ubiquity require simultaneously specialization and global presence. Partnerships among national institutions, international organizations, such as IOM, as well as other actors ensure that approaches to policy and practice embrace and respond to the actual complexity of migration dynamics.
In recent years, migration has become an increasingly visible phenomenon. Although the global proportion of migrants compared with non-migrants has been stable for decades at around 3 per cent of the world’s population (258 million in 2017, UN DESA 2017), the issue has recently emerged as a key international policy and governance issue, as well as a controversial and polarizing topic for the public opinion in several countries. The narrative of ‘invasion’, not uncommon in the public discourse and fed by images of the Mediterranean shipwrecks, has increasingly led to such responses labelled as ‘fortress Europe’. Concurrently, those same images highlight the extreme vulnerability of the people who risk their lives to reach the European El dorado. Such polarization concerns the very understanding of migration itself. The distinction, and sometimes the opposition of categories such as ‘refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’, very widespread in the media, constitutes an example. Nevertheless, the definition of economic migration remains elusive. This polarization feeds and is often fed by perceptions of ‘mass migration’, migration ‘crises’ and the like, which do not really correspond to migration figures.

The reality of migration is more complex and is constantly changing. Migration is shaped by the conditions under which it occurs, the reasons leading people to move, and the policy responses adopted in its regard, all of which
strongly influence its outcomes. As an example, the legal basis for the definition of a ‘refugee’ is the 1951 Refugee Convention, which was signed at a particular historical moment, following World War II during the Cold War. At the time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) considered people leaving their countries for economic reasons as eligible for refugee status, a definition that Western countries opposed to, which would have important impacts today (Gemenne, 2017).

The narratives of invasion often contrast with the reality. The proportion of international migrants has been stable at around 3 per cent for decades. Before 1940 this proportion was much higher, at around 6 per cent (Gemenne, 2018). However, it could be argued that the ‘crisis’ refers to the conditions of reception, in which many migrants find it more and more difficult to integrate, are more exposed to precariousness and sometimes, dehumanized. While most migrants move for labour purposes, the global stock of forcibly displaced persons (including asylum seekers, refugees and internally displaced persons) is estimated at 70.8 million people, mostly hosted in developing countries (UNHCR, 2019). Only a small proportion are in Europe, where most migration occurs through ordinary channels (de Haas, 2017).

The term migration applies to a variety of situations, from the British doctor living in the United States, to people crossing the Mediterranean Sea, to second-generation Italian nationals living in Switzerland. Categories such as ‘refugee’, ‘labour migrant’, ‘transit migrant’, and the like, are indeed difficult to apply strictly, as they are not mutually exclusive and the identification of the same person or her designation as belonging to one or several of such categories may vary over time.

Perceptions of migration as a ‘crisis’ find echo in a polarized political arena – at the international level, in universities, among the civil society, the private sector and in national institutions. Nevertheless, migration is also often portrayed as an aspect of development. This begs the question about how is
migration linked to development, whether migration promote development, and whether development, as a framework, affects migration? In short, this begs interrogating what the ‘nexus’ between migration and development is?

This paper focuses on the intimate links between Migration and Development. More specifically, the paper discusses how migration, as a complex phenomenon, affects policy outcomes in migrants’ host and home countries and on how sectoral policies, including integration policies, affect migration patterns and outcomes. The paper emphasizes the importance of analysing the link between Migration and Development in a systemic manner, taking into account the reciprocal effects of migration and the policies aiming to govern this phenomenon, rather than conceiving of such link as simple and linear. In other words, policies can affect migration outcomes, positively and negatively, as much as migration dynamics can affect sectoral policies’ outcomes. This paper proposes, thus, to better understand the complex and systemic ties that connect migration with other policy areas.

The paper starts with a reflection on the concept of migration, to trace how, historically, it has been linked to the concept of development. This allows focusing on the discourse on Migration and Development vis-à-vis the sectoral policies that shape or influence the link between the two areas. The paper then discusses international approaches to Migration and Development and their focus on the mobilization of migrants’ resources for development, taking a critical stance. It also focuses on the conditions under which such approaches may generate positive impacts, illustrated through concrete examples of practices supported by the Italian Government since the early 2000s. Finally, the paper highlights how integration constitutes a precondition to successfully link migration to development. Along these lines, the paper concludes with some recommendations on how to address the links between migration, integration and development more systematically in programmatic and policy approaches to promote this ‘triple’ nexus.
The notions of migration or migrant usually describe the movement of people from their home to settle, temporarily or permanently, in another location. However, these notions are not only descriptive, as they imply an array of different representations. In recent years, especially since 2015, migration has been at the forefront of the political scene in Europe, North America and beyond. Migration and migrants are widely discussed by the media around the world, influencing public opinion and representing migration in ways that are far from being neutral.

Migration as a phenomenon is well known by the large public. However, it is difficult to define ‘migrants’ as a specific social category. There are different official definitions of migration and of migrants, which suggest that defining these concepts is actually problematic (see textbox 1). The three definitions proposed in the textbox differ from one another. This implies, that the same person may, or may not be considered a migrant, depending on which definition is used.

UN DESA’s objective is to provide a framework to produce statistics; such a statistical definition must clearly define who a migrant is by considering parameters such as the duration of stay, or the purpose of migration. The purpose of the UN Migrant Workers’ Convention’s definition, in contrast, is
MIGRATION, MIGRANT, A MATTER OF DEFINITIONS

**Functional definition:**

*United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (UN Migrant Workers’ Convention, 1990).*

The present Convention shall apply during the entire migration process of the migrant workers and members of their families, which comprises preparation for migration, departure, transit and the entire period of stay and remunerated activity in the State of employment as well as return to the State of origin or the State of habitual residence.

The term “migrant worker” refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.

**Statistical definition: UN DESA (1998)**

International Migrant is defined as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence. A person’s country of usual residence is that in which the person lives, that is to say, the country in which the person has a place to live where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest. Temporary travel abroad for the purposes of recreation, holiday, business, medical treatment, or religious pilgrimage does not entail a change in the country of usual residence.

**Mandate-setting definition IOM (2019)**

Migrant: An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.
to identify persons entitled to protection under the Convention. In this case, a purely statistical definition could exclude people who may be exposed to the risk of exploitation even before leaving the country of origin. Therefore, the definition of migrant workers includes prospective migrants as well. Finally, IOM’s definition addresses migration in a comprehensive manner; throughout the diversity of situations it encompasses.

Formal (academic or policy) definitions, which may describe migration in a neutral manner, play a significant role in describing and representing the phenomenon. However, people’s perceptions also shape the way in which migration and migrants are represented in specific contexts and how the phenomenon of migration is addressed. To illustrate this point, we could ask, for example, whether all the people on the move are characterized as migrants in the public imaginary. For instance, is a British doctor working in the United States considered a migrant? Or, what are the fundamental differences between a ‘migrant’ and an ‘expat’?

The public opinion and prevalent media and policy discourses usually portray migrants as a category of poor people, mostly originating from Southern countries headed towards more developed Northern regions. Migrants, especially from Africa, Asia, Latin America in Western societies are often identified as such on the basis of their visibility and difference; they are often identified first as migrants rather than mothers, fathers, workers, gardeners, engineers, or simply men or women; as if they were defined by exclusion. In contrast, people from Northern countries moving to other Northern or even Southern countries are often called ‘expats’, as if the term ‘migrant’ was not applicable to these instances as well. Such categorizations of migration are telling of how perceptions of migration feed the media and political discourses.

The former begs questioning what migration is. The concept of migration describes a variety of situations of people on the move. This is of course an oversimplification, as describing migration in these terms would result in ignoring its social and political implications. However, there is clearly a gap
between the reality of migration in its various forms and the way in which
migration is addressed and the social dynamics it generates.

Therefore, migration phenomena cannot be solely understood as the
movement of people, but must be also analysed within the framework of
the reactions and the perceptions such mobility elicits, especially among
those societies that place themselves at the ‘receiving’ or ‘sending’ ends of
migration, even if these categories cannot be applied strictly to any society.

In short, the terms ‘migration’ and ‘migrant’ not only describe a reality
but are also social constructs: a set of representations that translate into
social, cultural and political dynamics, what migration and migrants are and
how they are perceived. As a social construct, migration includes the whole
body of images, representations, values, and sentiments that shape parts of
the migration reality. For example, migration as a social construct is made
visible by focusing on migrants from Southern countries who nonetheless
do not account for the majority of people on the move.

Perceptions are further important because they shape discourses, and
discourses shape politics. For instance, despite its vagueness, the category
‘economic migration’ has often been used in the past decade for political
purposes to discern between refugees (entitled to the protection of coun-
tries abiding to international law) and non-refugees, a broader category of
population at the centre of the political and popular debate on migration.
Although the category of ‘economic migrant’ hardly applies to any specific
situation, it is somewhat enacted through political discourses in several
countries.

This ‘induced reality’ has important impacts at international and perhaps
even more at national level. As an example, the European approach to
migration and development is based on a narrative of root causes (see
for instance, Alvarez, 2017 for a discussion), which should be identified and
addressed through the right policies and projects. In this view migration is
an automated response to a set of (adverse) conditions. While this may be
true in some cases, conceiving of migration as such reinforces the discourse about migration simply as a South–North phenomenon to be addressed as a potential crisis. Within this framework of representations, the link between migration and development is seen as causal: migration is explained as the result of lack of development.

The premise underlying this paper is that the reality is much more complex and is influenced by the social construction of migration. The term ‘migration’ is here used to describe multiple realities related to the movement of people; and the term ‘development’ is understood as the set of framework conditions that allow people to live dignified and satisfying lives, regardless of the geographical region in which they live (North or South).

Acknowledging migration and development as social constructs, in the following sections the paper will trace the historical evolution of the conceptualization of the links between these two areas, the policy approaches derived from such paradigms and how the Italian approach to Migration and Development has elicited the links between migration, integration and development.
The link between migration and development has long been discussed among scholars and policymakers. To discuss how this link translates into policymaking, this section reviews how its understanding has evolved throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, along with the development, migration, and geopolitical dynamics and ideological paradigms underlying its analysis. De Haas (2010a) provides a good account of this evolution by showing how the Migration and Development nexus has been analysed through alternating optimistic (until the early 1970s) and pessimistic approaches (between 1970s and the 1990s), although optimistic views seem to prevail since the 1990s. This account is summarized in what follows.

**OPTIMISTIC VIEWS AND MODERNIZATION THEORY**

Broadly speaking, optimistic views depict migration as a factor that promotes development. More precisely, de Haas (2010) explains how optimistic views are often ideologically associated to neoclassical economic development paradigms.¹

¹ Neoclassical economics is an orthodox school of thought focusing on supply and demand as factors determining market regulation. According to E. Roy Weintraub, it is based on the following three assumptions: i) People have rational preferences between outcomes that can be identified and associated with values; ii) individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits; and iii) people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.
According to optimistic views, migrants act as rational market actors who optimize utility through migration. As such, migration flows are generally represented as originating in countries characterized by low levels of development, towards more developed destination countries. Similarly, the decision to migrate, as well as the choice of the destination, are explained as the result of utility calculations. Within the framework, migration is expected to enable closing income gaps between origin and destination countries. Moreover, while the direction of migration is generally perceived as South–North, migration’s economic impacts (such as capital transfer) are assumed to flow in the opposite direction thanks to migrants.
As a result, such dynamics would allow closing development gaps between countries, and eventually lead to less migration. In other words, neoclassical optimistic views stipulate that migration, understood as a perfectly rational and cyclic phenomenon, necessarily leads to development and that more development necessarily translates into less migration.

Also, migration is seen as a cycle comprising departure and return, allowing thus the circulation of capital and skills. As pointed out by de Haas (2010a): “It was expected that migrants not only bring back money, but also new ideas, knowledge, and entrepreneurial attitudes. In this way, migrants were expected to play a positive role in development and contribute to the accelerated spatial diffusion of modernization in developing countries.”

These views were largely based on the observation of rural to urban migration, as well as on the historical migration patterns between Europe and the Americas.

Within this view, social, political and cultural dynamics underlying migration are disregarded or, at best, considered as externalities disrupting a market functioning perceived otherwise as optimal. Moreover, post-war neoclassical development models conceive of the latter as an inevitable and linear path from tradition to modernity, in which countries pass through distinct universal development stages (Rostow, 1960).  

2 Rostow’s (1960) model exemplifies the “modernization” view of development, on which neoclassical approaches to the link between migration and development are based. The “modernization” development paradigm emerged in a particular geopolitical period, marked by the end of World War II, the Cold War and decolonization. It is a critical period in international relations, as the equilibrium between countries needed to be restored to respond to the needs of newly independent countries, as well as to the tensions between the East and the West. The modern notions of development and underdevelopment were widely spread following the historical inaugural speech of the United States’ president Harry S. Truman in 1949: “[…] we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. […] The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. […] Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing,
explained in terms of Southern countries’ lack of capital and knowledge and thus migrants are depicted as agents that can facilitate the circulation of both types of assets.

PESSIMISTIC VIEWS AND DEPENDENCY THEORY
Optimistic views and the modernization theory of development were widely accepted until the 1960s–1970s. However, the perceived natural and unavoidable occurrence of development came under criticism, as both Eastern and Western development policies failed to deliver. A sort of “development fatigue”, as described by Rist (2007) was being felt in the intellectual spheres, exacerbated by the failure of the so-called ‘white elephants’ as well as by the oil crisis in 1973.

Pessimistic views of migration emerged in this historical moment, rooted in the Dependency theory of development, which portrayed migration as a means to escape from structural poverty rather than a strategy to maximize income and drive development. Pessimistic approaches put forward the notion of “brain drain” implying that only those better off are able to migrate, thus depriving origin countries from their most skilled population to the benefit of rich countries. Pessimistic views also assumed that when people leave home they cut ties with the country origin indefinitely and, therefore, a vicious circle whereby underdeveloped countries are constantly deprived and impoverished to the benefit of richer countries is perpetually reproduced.

and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens. [...] The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing [...] Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge. Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. [...]”.

3 Dependency theory is a reaction to Modernization theory, which stipulates that inequalities are structural to the world system, and that resources flow from the periphery (underdeveloped countries) to the centre (rich countries). Therefore, according to this view, the system is intrinsically unequal, and underdevelopment is a condition for the enrichment of the centre.
PLURALISTIC VIEWS

Both optimistic and pessimistic approaches based on Modernization and Dependency theories, respectively, are highly deterministic as they conceive of the relationship between migration and development as direct and causal. Both views explain migration as driven by the developmental differential between countries leading, however, to opposite outcomes depending on the theory adopted. Both approaches ignore social and cultural factors underlying migration and consider migrants as subjected to broader global economic considerations. In short, both views promote highly ideological perspectives considered universal and, therefore, fail to describe the reality in a more accurate and balanced manner. Since the emergence of developmentalism in the 1950s there has neither been a re-equilibration between “sending” and “receiving” countries, nor the perpetual vicious circles of underdevelopment and increased emigration described by pessimists have been verified.

On the contrary, some scholars suggest that an increase in development indicators (for example the Human Development Index, HDI),\(^4\) leads to an increase in migration until high to very high levels of human development are reached (de Haas, 2010b). Higher HDIs, for example, may mean that more people will aspire and be able to migrate. The capability to migrate is the possibility to do so: migration is costly, it requires money and networks that the poorest can hardly afford. Likewise, aspirations to migrate are shaped by a variety of factors, from higher levels of education, which could translate in the search for better professional prospects, to better access to information and other factors related to cultural dynamics, such as values. Withol de Wenden (2010) suggest that the reasons to migrate also encompass the notion of expectation, which responds, among others, to the representation of the destination. This representation is built through

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\(^4\) The HDI is a composite index used to measure development at the country level. It takes into account a set of economic and non-economic variables including the gross domestic product or GDP, life expectancy and education. The HDI is calculated as a function of life expectancy, income and education. Countries are ranked according to their HDI and subdivided into tiers: lowest 25 per cent, below median, above median, and highest 25 per cent.
the information passed on by migrants, as well as through images diffused by TV and other media.

Understanding migration through the lens of **people’s capabilities and aspirations** implies overcoming reductive econometric explanations. It entails recognizing migrants as human beings embedded in a social and cultural reality shaped by history, geography and policy (at local, national and international level) that affects societies and, in turn, migration’s determinants and outcomes.

A useful theoretical framework to illustrate this complexity is the notion of “social space” (espace social) introduced by Condominas (1980): “the ensemble of the systems of relations that characterize a given group”.\(^5\) The ‘social space’ is determined by the geographical setting, the relation to time and space, to the environment, the exchange of goods, communication, kinship and neighbourhood, as well as religious considerations. All these factors shape the way in which any given individual or group perceives its identity, its relation to others and to the world, as well as how different “others” are identified and perceived. It constitutes the framework for decision-making and value setting.

In a globalized world, where IT, social media, movies and the like allow acquiring images and impressions of remote places and to communicate with people located far away, the notion of social space not only encompasses one’s immediate locality, but goes well beyond, with a nearly global reach although with several degrees of insight. Today most people are exposed to partial visions of remote locations through images, movies, descriptions, discussions, and so on. Such partial visions, images or insights are interpreted with reference to one’s social space and contribute to shaping one’s aspirations.

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As such, the notion of social space allows understanding migration within the framework of a wide range of determinants and their interrelations, which shape people’s aspirations, decisions and reasons to migrate, rather than simply as a decision to maximize utility or flee poverty. In this sense, both migration aspirations and capabilities can be enhanced by factors related to higher development indicators such as the HDI, although the HDI alone cannot explain migration trends.
The recognition of the importance of overcoming simplistic econometric explanations led to the elaboration of more complex models to explain migrations and their links to development. As pointed out by de Haas (2010a, p.241), “an improved theoretical perspective on migration and development has to be able to account for the role of structure – the constraining or enabling general political, institutional, economic, social, and cultural context in which migration takes place – as well as agency – the limited but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure.”

More pluralistic views emerged from the 1990s onwards. The *New Economics of Labour Migration* (NELM), for example, explain migrations as a household risk-sharing strategy, which combines different activities to secure, increase and preserve the household’s livelihood. This approach departs from previous models focusing on individual migrants placing them within the social reality of the household. Migration is seen as part of a broader household strategy, which may include other activities, such as agriculture, entrepreneurship and so forth. Migrant remittances have an important role in such strategy, as they represent an additional income for receiving households.

Migrants’ transnational ties were also increasingly recognized. Indeed, migrants who settle abroad do not necessarily cut their ties with their home communities. By moving, individuals extend their social space and create or maintain networks with other migrants and with people in their host and home societies. Therefore, migrants develop multiple loyalties and their social, cultural and economic ties spread across transnational networks. Migration and Development approaches that recognize such transnationalism often depict “diasporas” as development actors who bridge countries and facilitate the flow of remittances, knowledge and development initiatives in their home country.

Furthermore, the recognition of the importance of social dynamics embedded in the household, in home localities or in transnational networks, allowed overcoming migrants’ representation as passive actors responding to the economic dynamics related to the flow or distribution of capital,
simply reacting to factors that *push* them away from home and *pull* them into specific locations. The recognition of migrants’ aspirations led to broader explanations of why people decide to move and to admit that not every culture shares the same values, and not every individual shares the same desires, nor the same expectations about how to fulfil them. Peoples’ different “social spaces” shape their aspirations, which require different capabilities to be fulfilled. It became increasingly accepted that the link between migration and development rests in the possibility to acquire the means to move and that people’s aspirations and capabilities are closely related. This shed further light on how migrants contribute to the development of their home countries through their networks and connections.

Despite being more comprehensive than optimistic or pessimistic models, these approaches continued to implicitly consider migration as a South–North–South trend, where, ultimately, people’s aspirations and capabilities lead them to wealthier places. Notably, these models emerged in parallel with the neoliberal approaches in developed countries (see textbox 2). When it comes to migration, this neoliberal shift corresponds to the emergence of a discourse focused on remittances and on “productive investments”, which shaped the rise of Migration and Development in the international arena since the 1990s. The following section focuses on the way in which Migration and Development has evolved as a matter of international policy and how it has been translated into practice.
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND NEOLIBERAL APPROACHES

The Washington Consensus is a set of prescriptions shared by three Washington-based institutions: The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United States Department of Treasury. They constitute what is today informally labelled as the neoliberal approach, which promotes trade liberalization, reduction of public spending on subsidies, and the privatization of State enterprises. Neoliberal economic policies assume that the free market can achieve universal wealth and sustain growth, and that competition is a key element of development.

In this sense, everyone, independently from the social, cultural, environmental and historical factors that affect our lives, can reach personal success through market dynamics. Moreover, the notion of extreme poverty (1.25 USD/day), is intrinsically linked to neoliberalism, as it is perceived as the threshold above which, through entrepreneurial activities, individuals could change their own condition.

Neoliberal approaches affect the Migration and Development discourse today insofar as they tend to reduce the link between migration and development to monetary remittances and entrepreneurship, disregarding local specificities and social dynamics.
During the last two decades, the discourse on the link between migration and development gained significant importance within international politics and the international arena. Starting from the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, several international fora have addressed the topic that became increasingly known as the Migration and Development nexus. Two United Nations High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development have been held (2006 and 2013), and several meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) have gathered government and non-government actors discuss Migration and Development policy issues since 2007. International working groups, such as the Global Migration Group (GMG), also contributed to shaping the Migration and Development international agenda. Absent from the Millennium Development Goals, the link between migration and development is now embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Similarly, at national level, several countries created dedicated ministries or entities responsible for engaging with their diasporas and developing Migration and Development policies.

The international recognition of the Migration and Development nexus contributed to shaping an agenda largely based on the principles of optimistic
and other more comprehensive approaches. The *leitmotif* of such agenda became the search for solutions to maximize the developmental impact of migration, with the underlying assumption that, through effective policies, migrants’ agency can be strengthened for the benefit of their countries of origin. Practice focused, therefore, on the common goal of implementing strategies to mobilize migrants’ resources or “capitals”: financial capital (savings, remittances), human capital (skills), social capital (networks) and sometimes cultural capital (values), for example, through the facilitation of remittances, *entrepreneurship and diaspora engagement*.

The following next sections briefly discuss the relevance of these strategies to promote the Migration and Development nexus.

**REMITTANCES**

Remittances are monetary transfers sent home by migrants. The World Bank (2018) estimates global remittances in 2018 at USD 689 billion, including flows to high-income countries; and officially recorded annual remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries at USD 529 billion, more than Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and comparable to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). While these figures are estimates based on econometric models (Alvarez et al., 2015) and thus are not precise, they are telling of the importance of the volume of remittance flows, as is the global presence of money transfer operators such as Western Union or MoneyGram worldwide.

Remittances represent a lifeline for migrants’ households as additional income; therefore, they have long been perceived as the direct link between migration and development. Indeed, when remittances are used to afford health, education or social insurance, or for investments deemed as ‘productive’, they have an impact on households’ overall welfare, on these sectors and, therefore, on development.

However, to fully appreciate the link between remittances and development it is necessary to take into consideration other factors as well,
such as how remittances are earned, sent and spent. Regarding how remittances are earned, it is important to recognize that these are private resources, which represent a share of migrants’ income or wages, sent across borders to reach families, relatives or friends. It is well known that remittances constitute small amounts sent frequently. For instance, in Turin Moroccan, Romanian and Peruvian nationals sent on average EUR 236 in 2014 every month, and EUR 1,425.12 annually (World Bank, 2014). The average monthly income reported by senders was EUR 1,037.65 for men and EUR 869.98 for women. According to the OECD, average monthly wages in Italy at the time were EUR 2,385.6 This indicates that migrants surveyed by the World Bank earned less than half of the average national income. These figures show that not only migrants send high shares of their wages, but also that their wages are far below the national average. From this perspective, it is important to acknowledge the human dimension of remittances in so far as they represent a significant part of migrants’ hard-earned livelihoods.

Concerning how remittances are sent, the World Bank points out that the global average cost of sending remittances remains at around 7 percent in the first quarter of 2019, meaning that for each EUR 100 sent EUR 7 are lost in transaction costs. This is where part of the international effort on linking remittances to development is focused, as shown by Sustainable Development Goal 10.c: “by 2030 reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction cost of migrant remittances”.

Finally, concerning how remittances are spent, there is an overwhelming international effort to redirect remittances towards a ‘productive use’, implying several things from investment to education or health expenditures. This is probably the most problematic point about the strategies aimed at leveraging on remittances as part of the Migration and Development nexus. Education and health are usually the object of specific sectoral policies, which are often strictly related to development. The fulfilment

6 Italy Average Nominal Monthly Wages, available at https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/wages
of the goals of such sectoral policies is one of the main responsibilities of states, which design strategies to manage schools and hospitals and ensure universal access to these services. Relying on remittances to afford or access education or health services somehow entails shifting development responsibilities from public (States) to private actors (individual migrants) and risks aggravating inequalities between those better off (who receive remittances) and the rest.

This begs the question of sustainability: to what extent is it desirable to rely on migrants’ hard-earned remittances to promote fundamental aspects of development such as education and health? This question nuances the remittances “development mantra” (Kapur, 2004) and recognizes that the link between migration and development is more complex as it influences and is influenced by a wide range of sectoral policies both in migrants’ home and host countries.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The Migration and Development nexus policy has also translated into the promotion of migrant-led (including returnees) entrepreneurship, especially in their countries of origin. Optimistic approaches see migration as a cycle, where migrants acquire skills and/or money while abroad, which they can reinvest upon return. Although these approaches are conceptually outdated, international Migration and Development strategies still give much credit to entrepreneurship and to the role of migrants and returning migrants in development.

Entrepreneurship is considered as an utterly important mechanism of economic development, as creating a successful business is undoubtedly an effective way to create jobs and to boost a country’s economy. Policy approaches to Migration and Development often consider migrants as “super-entrepreneurs” (Nausdé et al., 2017), based on the assumption that they are less “risk adverse” than other segments of the population. This perception is also based on well-known success stories, such as those of migrants in the Silicon Valley or in China. However, as pointed out by
Nausdé et al. (2017), empirical evidence to affirm that migrants are indeed natural-born entrepreneurs is poor. On the contrary, according to OECD (2010), in countries with larger immigrant populations such as Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands, migrants are less likely than natives to be self-employed.

When it comes to return and entrepreneurship, studies seem to indicate that return migrants are indeed prone to entrepreneurship. Nausdé et al. mention studies in several countries that support this assumption, showing how return migrants are statistically more disposed to start-up businesses than non-migrants. Some studies such as Wahba and Zenou (2012) show similar results, but point nonetheless to a bias: the decision to return may coincide with the decision to open a business, potentially implying that return migrants are not necessarily more entrepreneurial, but that those who decide to return often do so with the idea of starting an activity.

All the studies reviewed by Nausdé et al. state the importance of specific conditions that directly influence entrepreneurial behaviour and success, such as the experience and duration of migration, and migrants’ savings and skills. When analysing the relationship between migration and entrepreneurship, it is important to keep in mind the diversity of situations to which the notion of migration applies. Similarly, the return of migrants may occur under very different circumstances. Cassarino (2004) insists on the importance of considering two key factors in defining return preparedness when conceptualizing return migration: the readiness and the willingness to return. As he puts it, the emphasis is on returnees’ “ability to gather tangible and intangible resources when return takes place autonomously. The higher the level of preparedness, the greater the ability of returnees to mobilise resources autonomously and the stronger their contribution to development.”

Cassarino (2016) explains preparedness in relation to the completeness of the migration cycle, arguing that reintegration success is largely dependent
on whether the migration cycle is complete, incomplete or interrupted. Casarino depicts a complete migration cycle as one in which return is desired and well planned; an incomplete cycle, in contrast, is provoked by unexpected factors (family problems, difficulties in the host country and the like) that lead people to return when they are not yet ready to mobilize their resources; and yet an interrupted cycle refers to people being compelled to return, which implies that returnees do not have a choice (such as in the case of a rejected asylum request, deportation, war, non-renewal of job contract and so forth).

The completeness of the cycle matters when it comes to retuning migrants’ entrepreneurship. Cassarino (2015) further shows, through an in-depth research in Tunisia, that 227 returnees out of a sample of 726 were entrepreneurs, self-employed both in the formal and informal sector. When analysing job creation, the same study shows that 77 per cent of the returnees who were employers had completed a migratory cycle.

The former reveals once again that it would be misleading to oversimplify the Migration and Development nexus by assuming that migrants are necessarily entrepreneurs, or that their businesses create jobs. Indeed, setting-up a successful business depends, not least, on factors such as willingness, capacity, opportunity, and resources; being a migrant does not automatically translate into being a natural-born entrepreneur. As shown in the case below (see textbox 3) the link between migration and development is also influenced by the conditions in host countries.

**DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT**

Diaspora engagement is another important area of practice covered by international Migration and Development strategies. The main assumption underlying such practice is that migrants who share the same origin, country, region or continent of residence organize in groups that can be mobilized to contribute to the development of their countries of affiliation.
Since 2015 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation support the MigraVenture programme implemented by IOM and Etimos Foundation.

The philosophy of the programme takes a shift from conventional approaches to migrant entrepreneurship in so far as it neither assumes that all migrants are entrepreneurs or willing to invest in their home country, nor that migrant entrepreneurship is necessarily linked to return. Instead, MigraVenture is based on the acknowledgement that some migrants do have the capacity to set-up successful businesses, which is not an easy venture, and thus people may need capacity-building and funding support to materialize a good idea.

MigraVenture aims to support promising business ideas led by migrants from Africa. To do so, the programme provides technical and financial support to business ideas selected through public calls and evaluated by a team of experts.

More precisely, MigraVenture offers three types of support to selected business ideas. Firstly, a multi-stage training (in group and individualized) to improve the business ideas and allow entrepreneurs to acquire relevant skills. Trainings address such topics as business development, access to credit and capital tools, marketing tools, risks and opportunities in the African market. The aim is to create a valid business plan. Secondly, access to a pilot capitalization fund that invests in projects with a high potential to contribute to socioeconomic development. The fund, which intervenes with a minority stake in the company’s capital, aims to support the company’s growth and consolidation, so that the entrepreneur becomes the sole owner afterwards. A dedicated micro-equity tool was created for this purpose. Thirdly, entrepreneurs benefit from coaching in the countries where the business activities are implemented. A team of experts ensures constant support during the various stages of start-ups, in order to maximize their chances of success.

MigraVenture targets entrepreneurs of African origin residing in Italy who express the will of and demonstrate the capacity to start a new business or to consolidate existing business in an African country. Since 2015, 105 African entrepreneurs (who presented their business ideas in the framework of two public calls) have been involved in the MigraVenture program. Of these, 41 entrepreneurs benefited from training, 33 were accompanied through personalized coaching, and 10 projects have been selected to access the capitalization fund.

MigraVenture’s approach, based on quality rather than quantity, focuses on the factors of success and acknowledges the importance of preparedness and pre-existing capacity in the establishment of successful business ventures. MigraVenture does not aim to promote business creation a priori, rather, it enhances existing ideas demonstrating clear factors for success.
Migrants who share similar backgrounds often gather into associations or organizations, some of which promote development in the home countries by financing projects in sectors such as health, education, water and sanitation. As such, diasporas are considered important development actors, as demonstrated by the creation of diaspora ministries and other institutional entities with a related mandate in several countries. Indeed, diaspora organizations are transnational actors, whose social space tangibly encompasses both their home and host country or region.

As opposed to approaches focusing on remittances or entrepreneurship, diaspora engagement practice builds on transnationalism and the links between home and host territories at national and local level. As an example, the “Milan for co-development” initiative is based on a decentralized cooperation approach that engages institutional and non-institutional actors in Lombardy and abroad, migrant associations and local NGOs to promote local-to-local development cooperation. Similarly, diaspora engagement strategies focus mostly on associations, although individuals are also engaged, for example, through the mobilization of qualified professionals residing abroad to undertake short-term assignments in their home countries to transfer their skills to their local peers.

These strategies are certainly important. However, it is also central to point out to a few key issues which may sometimes be disregarded when it comes to policy and practice concerning diaspora engagement. A key consideration relates to the fact that the term diaspora does not describe a specific reality. People who share the same origin and place of residence are not necessarily connected or organized into associations; they may neither share the same prospects or

7 Starting from 2007, Milan Municipality is involved in a long term experimental program called “Milan for co-development” https://bit.ly/2xzuxt5. This unique experience in Italy, implemented by the Development Aid Office of Milan – International Relations Department, mainstreaks migration in development at the local level.
vision about their origin country, nor the desire to engage in development. Moreover, not all diaspora organizations’ projects are necessarily relevant or effective. For example, if a diaspora organization builds a modern hospital in hometown that lacks electricity supply and doctors, the hospital will not serve its purpose. This shows that diaspora projects implemented in the absence of relevant policies do not automatically materialize the link between migration and development. Finally, the willingness of a diaspora organization (or of any organization for that matter) to contribute to the development of a territory is not sufficient per se. Project development and implementation require skills and financial means, which are not necessarily available to just any organization. Transnational engagement goes beyond migrants’ private resources, it requires financial and organizational support.

Finally, migrants do not always organize with the objective to support the development of their origin country. Some migrant groups may be formed in opposition to the home government; others may emerge as unions to protect foreign workers in a country; yet others may promote cultural diffusion in the place of residence.

Therefore, while diaspora engagement is an effective way to promote development, the link between the activities of diaspora groups and development outcomes in the countries of origin is neither direct nor automatic. The success and impact of diaspora-led development initiatives largely depend on the specific circumstances in the contexts of intervention, which can be enhanced through public policies and structural initiatives not only on the countries of origin, but also in the countries of residence (see textbox 4).
Since 2011, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation supported the “A.MI.CO. - Associazioni Migranti per il Co-Sviluppo” training courses implemented by IOM and, since 2016, together with the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, the A.MI.CO. Award.

The A.MI.CO. programme is based on the understanding that the capacity of some migrant associations that act as transnational bridges and play a decisive role in sustainable development processes can be enhanced through training and funding. A.MI.CO. does not aim at transforming migrant associations into development actors a priori, but at strengthening those associations already engaged in development activities.

A.MI.CO. focuses on enhancing the associations’ organizational capacity, through the organization of the A.MI.CO. training course; and providing opportunities for the consolidation of the associations’ capacities and initiatives through an Award consisting of financial co-funding, technical support and monitoring for the best project ideas.

The A.MI.CO. training courses combine in-depth lectures and workshops and are based on participatory learning approaches. Participants receive theoretical and practical information to strengthen the associations’ administrative management, financial planning and management, fundraising and project cycle management at large (project development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). The added value of the course, beyond its content, is that it is tailored to the local contexts and the actual needs of participants. Similarly, the courses promote networking among associations enhancing mutual learning and experience sharing. Throughout the years, 36 local partners have been involved in the courses and more than 100 diaspora associations have attended the A.MI.CO. training course across Italy, in Campania, Lazio, Lombardy, Apulia and Sicily. The course is now organized as a face-to-face interregional workshop gathering associations across the national territory to foster greater interconnection and exchange.

Since 2016 IOM launched the A.MI.CO. Award (up to EUR 20,000), to complement the associations’ capacity-building process. The award was designed to support the implementation of the best project ideas perfectioned during the training. The project ideas are selected by a multidisciplinary team through a restricted call open to those associations that completed the A.MI.CO. training course. To date, 30 project proposals were submitted – by single associations, in partnership or in consortia – for the implementation of co-development initiatives in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. The proposals engage various stakeholders from local authorities, to non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, associations and private individuals, and touch upon different areas of intervention, from culture to agriculture, health and textiles. So far, 14 project proposals have been granted the A.MI.CO.
Award through a competitive selection process. Awardees are implementing co-development projects that directly relate to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals locally in Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Italy, Madagascar, Morocco, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Through the programme, beyond the positive impacts of training and the opportunity to enhance the associations’ capacities by implementing their project ideas, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation and IOM are contributing to framing the contribution of diaspora associations to development in a more comprehensive manner. For example, the diversity of the associations involved, sometimes composed of nationals from one single country, of migrants from different countries and new generation Italians, allows recognizing how diverse ‘migrant’ associations are, and how crucial it is to avoid defining ‘diaspora’ as a homogeneous category. The A.MI.CO. programme offers these truly transnational associations that have concrete projects an enabling framework to strengthen their capacities, impact and networks, thus redefining the object of diaspora engagement strategies.
The three thematic areas briefly discussed above show that the link between migration and development may not always be direct or immediate. These examples reveal that migrants are neither necessarily, nor automatically, agents of development and that migrants like many other people have resources and networks, or different forms of capital, but in the case of migrants, these resources are transnational.

Furthermore, the three examples discussed in the previous section demonstrate that the effectiveness of Migration and Development approaches based on remittances, entrepreneurship or diaspora engagement depends on broader policy settings in both home and host territories, and on the intentions and capacities of migrants themselves.

Considering all migrants as a homogeneous category of people who are willing to and capable of contributing to the development of their home countries is misleading and denies both individuals’ diversity and the structural constraints that influence migrants’ initiatives. It points to the fact that migrants’ initiatives are most likely to thrive in enabling contexts that both empower migrants in the host countries and accompany their initiatives in home countries.
A SYSTEMIC RELATIONSHIP

Bearing the former considerations in mind, this section explores whether the link between migration and development is one-sided (for instance does it rely only upon what migrants do for development?), as suggested by approaches focusing on remittances, entrepreneurship or diaspora engagement, or otherwise. The answer to this question requires exploring how migration and development connect at different levels.

At the individual level, factors such as the household structure, gender roles, the representation of migration or local economic prospects impact people’s aspirations and modalities of migration. For example, a person may decide to migrate because this is what is socially expected from all youth.
in a specific community, or because of changes in the environmental or socioeconomic conditions including in the local labour market that make life more difficult. Similarly, gender roles may affect in different ways men’s and women’s migration decisions, and the level of income and education can impact both migration aspirations and results.

At a higher, structural level, several factors can shape migration aspirations and outcomes as well. These factors may relate to sectoral policies, such as those concerning the labour market, rural or urban policies, educational policies, or even trends such as nationalism or xenophobia, to name but a few examples. For instance, the implementation of agricultural policies may lead people to move to urban centres and, in turn, the lack of prospects in cities may lead people to migrate abroad. Also, access to better education may lead people to aspire to migrate in search for higher salaries or new opportunities.

Finally, at the international or global level, climate change, international relations, the existence of bilateral or multilateral agreements, all affect migration. A good example of how migration and development affect one another is the opening of the Schengen area, which deeply modified mobility across Europe. Free movement or free circulation zones, such as the European Union, were built on economic models based on facilitating the mobility of people. In this sense, migration is not only a building block of Europe’s economy, but it is also an intrinsic part of its prosperity. Migration is a driver of Europe’s development.

Another example of the reciprocal relationship between migration and development is the case of trade liberalization in Ghana combined with policies aimed to support exports in Europe, which to some extent contributed to shape Ghanaian migration to Italy.\(^8\) Before the suppression of

import taxes in Ghana, tomato production was sustainable in the country. The sudden arrival of cheap, imported canned tomatoes from Italy and China disrupted the internal market and led to a sharp decrease in local tomato production. In Italy, tomato production destined to the African market relies heavily on Ghanaian seasonal work. This case shows how trade policies, which affected the Ghanaian and Italian agricultural sectors, ultimately affected migration patterns as well. In other words, Ghanaian migration is partly a consequence of the implementation of trade (or ‘development’) policies.

Another example is the phenomenon of ageing populations, especially in the North, which poses serious challenges to the labour markets and social security schemes of some countries. Migration can contribute to renewing the labour force and the pool of contributors to fiscal and social security schemes. However, migration alone cannot address or reverse the effects of ageing populations. Countries with ageing populations and restrictive admission or labour migration policies may be compelled to raise the age of retirement and face the consequences of such policy choices, for example, in terms of health and social well-being. From this perspective, migration is an intrinsic aspect of development.

These examples show that migration can be a consequence, a driver or an intrinsic part of development, as well as how complex it is to define the Migration and Development nexus. As a matter of fact, it becomes clear that migration affects development, and that development policies also affect migration patterns. More precisely, migration affects the outcomes of sectoral policies, and the latter, in turn, affect migration dynamics.

Acknowledging the complexity of the Migration and Development nexus allows replacing approaches based simply on the mobilization of migrants’ resources to consider migration’s impacts on other policies and the effects of these policies on migration (see textbox 5).
Since the early 2000s, Italy has been a leading actor in the global Migration and Development arena, committed at the highest levels to drive forward international dialogue and innovation to empower migrants as key development actors in Italy and beyond. Italy has increasingly recognized that migration can be a driver, a result or a consequence of development dynamics and has thus approached migration and development as a systemic manner.

Indeed, Italy has long understood that for migration to promote development, it is key to adopt a comprehensive approach focusing on enhancing migrants’ capabilities at home, as well as in Italy. This approach is closely aligned with IOM’s the “3Es strategy”, which consists in: a) engaging with migrants and transnational communities in development processes by understanding their characteristics, needs, motivations and capabilities as well as reaching out to them; b) creating enabling conditions to develop migrants’ and their organizations’ full potential in the societies that they bridge; and c) empowering transnational communities, through capacity-building, funding or technical support, so that they can become effective agents of development, if they so wish.

This approach values individual migrants’ diversity and the diversity of their organizations, motivations, skills, and stories. It recognizes the need for supporting migrants’ integration in their host countries as a key factor in the design and implementation of successful development initiatives.

Along these lines, in 2014 Italy officially recognized the role of migrants and diasporic actors as enablers of sustainable development in the General Rules Governing International Development Cooperation (Italian Law n. 125/2014). The Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union actively advocated for Migration and Development and convened an international high-level conference in 2014. Italy has supported the structuration of a Diaspora Summit at national level and welcomes the representation of diasporas in national development cooperation consultation instances.

Italy has also long partnered with organizations such as IOM to set enabling framework conditions for migrants to successfully become – or remain – development actors. Among the flagship programmes supported by Italy, since the early 2000s the projects “Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)” and “Migration for Development in Latin America (MIDLA)” provided tailor-made capacity-building to engage, enable and empower key migrant individuals and associations and enhance their transnational impact. These programmes were specifically tailored to the needs of the target countries and to the profiles and aspirations of migrants.

The conceptualization of migrants as agents of development, and the focus on migrants’ profiles and aspirations are central to Italy’s Migration and Development approach. Capacity-building is a key component of this approach, as is based on the acknowledgment that
the most successful projects are those formulated by migrants themselves. In this sense, capacity-building is a means to empower migrants rather than an end. The aim is to support existing initiatives rather than assuming that all migrants are necessarily development actors. This philosophy is embedded in all the initiatives implemented by IOM and supported by the Italian Development Cooperation, including MigraVenture and AM.I.CO. (see textboxes above), which focus on enhancing or scaling-up the effects of promising initiatives through capacity-building and targeted support.

Recalling the example of diaspora engagement, the construction of a hospital by a diaspora organization and its functioning clearly depends on the existence of supporting health, education, and infrastructure policies. These policies determine factors such as the presence of doctors, accessibility to the hospital, energy supply and so on. Similarly, policies governing specific economic factors will impact and be influenced by returning migrants’ entrepreneurship initiatives in the sectors where businesses are created.

**MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK (1): THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGs)**

In September 2015, the United Nations’ member States unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by 2015. When it comes to migration, the shift from the MDGs to the SDGs was significant, as the SDGs included for the first time in the global development framework issues related to migration. Migration is explicitly mentioned in five out of the 169 targets:

- 8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment.

- 10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

- 10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent.

- 16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.
- 17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

Although this represents an undeniable progress compared to the MDGs, as pointed out by ODI (2017) the link between migration and development is not really highlighted elsewhere in the SDGs, despite the fact that migration can potentially impact and be impacted by the outcomes of any other goal or target.

Understanding the Migration and Development nexus as a reciprocal relationship between migration and other policy areas implies that, depending on specific contexts, migration can potentially affect the outcomes of any of the 169 targets, as much as these can affect migration patterns and outcomes.

ODI (2017) published a series of briefings showing how several SDGs (for instance on urbanization, citizenship, poverty, health, gender, education, climate change, social protection, energy, water and sanitation) relate to migration. The analyses reveal that migration is indeed cross-cutting to all SDGs and provide recommendations on how to consider migration in the design of development strategies.

**MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK (2): THE GLOBAL COMPACT FOR SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR MIGRATION**

Another key global instrument for cooperation on migration governance is the Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular Migration adopted by 152 United Nations’ Member States in December 2018. The Global Compact for Migration, perhaps less known by the general public than the SDGs, is a non-binding global framework for international cooperation on managing migration at local, national, regional and global level. Its 23 objectives aim to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin; reduce the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face at different stages of migration by respecting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights and providing them with care and assistance; address the legitimate concerns of states and communities, while recognizing that societies are undergoing demographic, economic, social and environmental changes at different scales that may have implications for and result from migration; and create conducive conditions that enable all migrants to enrich our societies and thus facilitate their contributions to sustainable development at all levels.
The Global Compact for Migration is a non-binding document; however, it is grounded in the existing international legal framework and, therefore, approaches migration through a coherent approach, and constitutes a starting point towards a comprehensive migration governance framework.

The Global Compact for Migration also recognizes the mutual relationship between migration and development, as it is “rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and builds upon its recognition that migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the sustainable development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses” (Global Compact for Migration para. 15).

Similarly, the Compact recognizes that “migration is a multidimensional reality that cannot be addressed by one government policy sector alone. To develop and implement effective migration policies and practices, a whole-of-government approach is needed to ensure horizontal and vertical policy coherence across all sectors and levels of government” (Global Compact for Migration para 15).

Such a multi-dimensional approach is also reflected in the Compact’s 23 objectives revealing an understanding of migration as a global and complex phenomenon, which cannot be addressed based on simple dichotomies opposing North and South, Origin and Destination, Developed and Developing countries. For example, some objectives that touch upon issues such as remittances, entrepreneurship, or return are embedded in a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the importance of sound integration policies and international cooperation to ensure that migrants are empowered wherever they are.

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INTEGRATION: THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT?

The Migration and Development nexus concerns prospective migrants, migrants abroad, immigrants, and return migrants, but is not limited to what migrants do for development. The Migration and Development nexus concerns migration in its full complexity and its interlinkages with multiple social, economic, political, and cultural features.

Migrants, wherever they are, act within a social space that encompasses a reality much broader than migration alone. Their experience of transnationalism, to various degrees, is rooted in different realities, where migration is only one among many other features of their experience. This strongly suggests that encouraging migrants’ their entrepreneurship, influencing their remittance behaviours or promoting migrant associations’ engagement in development
as the materialization of the link between Migration and Development is, at best, reductive. After all, migrants are but one type of transnational development actors; there are many non-migrant associations or non-governmental organizations that work on development; and remittances are just shares of hard-earned salaries but do not constitute the bulk of development financing. Similarly, focusing on the mobilization of migrants’ resources without considering the realities in which they participate is not only reductive but also risky, as migrants’ resources may be put at the core rather than their well-being.

As an example, imagine a migrant from a poor country who wishes to return home to set up a business, but could not learn the language while abroad because compelled to perform only low-wage, low-skilled jobs without opportunities for continuous learning or meaningful interaction with the local society. In this case, we could ask what the added value of this person’s experience was, beyond perhaps her ability to send money home? Or, beyond providing cheap labour in sectors shunned by the local population, what added value could the migrant contribute to the receiving society? These questions point to the risk of focusing on resource mobilization without considering the conditions under which migrants’ resources are generated which provide a misleading or poor understanding of the links between migration and development.
These questions highlight the fundamental importance of integration processes as a key feature of the Migration and Development nexus. This may seem trivial, but everywhere in the world integration policies and development policies are dealt with under separate mechanisms, and only a few countries have truly adopted whole-of-government approaches to policy planning looking at the interaction and coherence between migration and different sectoral policies, including those relating to inclusion and social cohesion. Only recently, through mechanisms such as the Global Compact for Migration, these policy sectors are being connected within more comprehensive frameworks, indicating that there is a progressive understanding of the systemic nature of the Migration and Development nexus.

MIGRANTS’ POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A KEY COMPONENT OF THE LINK BETWEEN MIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Many migrants effectively participate to the economic, cultural and social life of their host societies, but quite often they do not participate in the political life. Civic rights are usually restricted to nationals, while affecting the whole population. At the national level integrating migrants’ perspectives into political processes may be challenging. However, at the level of municipalities or regions migrants’ participation can be facilitated through the establishment of consultative bodies which build on the recognition that a territory is constituted by all its inhabitants.

Consultative bodies exist in several settings and provide effective platforms for migrants’ representation in governance processes related to the host territory, without hampering citizenship principles.

In Palermo, as in other localities in Italy, the “Consulta delle culture” was created in 2013. It is a consultative body composed of 21 elected representatives with migrant backgrounds. EU and non-EU nationals, as well as dual citizens and stateless people are eligible to seat in the “Consulta delle culture”.

The aim of the “Consulta delle culture” is to provide migrants with a voice on Palermo’s life, bridging the different communities with the city’s administration through dialogue and exchange. Since its creation in 2013, the “Consulta delle culture” became a symbol of Palermo’s openness, showing how access to political participation is a key aspect of integration.
Integration policies are those that empower migrants by allowing them to participate in their host society and access opportunities on an equal foot vis-à-vis their neighbours and exercise their agency. Migrants’ access to resources, experience, skills, and networks is strongly influenced by integration policies.

Therefore, without policies enabling migrants to communicate, use and develop their skills, influence the society where they live or feel at home and protected, it is difficult to expect that their projects are successful or effective. Similarly, without such policies, it is difficult to envisage a significant impact of migration on the welfare of the host country.

Recognizing the importance of integration sheds a new light to approaches based simply on the mobilization of migrants’ resources, emphasizing the underlying conditions for success. While not all migrants are necessarily willing or capable to engage in development, integration is nonetheless a key precondition for the success of those who actually intend to do so.
Migration and development mutually affect one another. This link, which ties migration with the outcomes of multiple sectoral policies, does not exist in isolation and is shaped by factors such as the discourses that surround migration which, in turn, affect the way it is governed. Overall, migration is a component of social, cultural and political systems at different levels of governance, from the local to the global. This is true for the places where migrants come from, as well as for the places where they reside.

As such, the Migration and Development nexus necessarily passes through integration. Integration policies in one country have a direct impact on migrants’ capabilities and their ‘agency’ or capacity to act in another country and eventually on their developmental impacts. Integration empowers migrants and enables them to fulfil their aspirations. When these are related to the development of their countries of origin, through return, diaspora engagement or other transnational activities, integration plays a crucial role in determining the success and positive outcomes of such initiatives.

Against this background, to maximize the Migration–integration-development nexus and minimize the negative mutual impacts some considerations are due.
First, it is important to realize that migrants are human beings, not numbers. As human beings they have multiple stories, profiles, aspirations, capacities and motivations, which are only partially shaped by the migration experience. In other words, being a migrant is just a small part of who people are. Therefore, it would be misleading to design strategies based on universal approaches that assume that they will work in the same way for every individual or group. After all, diversity is a richness, not an obstacle. Tailor-made strategies and diversified tools which target people’s specific profiles, capacities, and aspirations, rather than considering migrants as a homogeneous category of population, are more likely to have positive impacts. Projects such as MigraVenture, which strengthen entrepreneurs who demonstrate existing potential for success, or A.M.I.CO, which targets well established organizations are built on this assumption. This approach that values diversity also allows realizing that migrant associations leading successful projects are not necessarily composed exclusively by migrants, or by people sharing the same origin. In fact, integration policies create dynamics where people are able to identify with one another and gather regardless of their citizenship or backgrounds.

Second, the migration—development—integration nexus is shaped by a variety of sectoral policies in specific contexts. Therefore, it is important to adopt policy approaches not exclusively focused on migration but focused on understanding how migration both affects and is affected by different sectoral policies. Migration governance is a cross-cutting issue, where the whole policy framework is sensitive to migration and where migration is integrated into sectoral policies, both locally and nationally. The Italian cooperation policy recognizes the importance of the whole-of-government and sectoral approach, reflected for example in the triennial programmatic document.

Third, a holistic approach to migration requires resources. The programmes and policies that are based on a thorough understanding of particular
situations, as well as on the provision of the right amount of effort to ensure tailor-made and evidence-based initiatives are those more likely to generate positive impacts. Although in principle one-size fits all programmes seem to require less resources, tailor-made projects, which have greater impacts, have de facto a higher return on investment. Targeting a relatively small number of high potential beneficiaries, and providing them with the relevant tools, guarantees more sustainability than assuming that everyone can be a successful entrepreneur if provided with a small grant. The Italian Voluntary Contribution to IOM allows designing appropriate programmes, testing them and adapting them, as shown through success stories piloted through this contribution.

Fourth, the complexity of migration requires both specialization and global presence. The long-time successful collaboration between the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the recently established Italian Agency for Development Cooperation and IOM certainly rests on their complementarity. This reveals the importance of partnerships and the role of agencies such as IOM, which acts facilitate and provide technical support to Italy’s Migration and Development strategies. Such a partnership, and the exchanges it implies, is the guaranty of an ever evolving and adaptable approach, based on a realistic understanding of migration and of the dynamics affecting its relationship with other sectors.

An effective migration-integration-development approach is, therefore, an approach designed outside the conceptual siloes of single policy sectors, based on complementarity and partnerships, as well as on the understanding of migrants’ humanity. The complexity of migration and its links to a broad range of realities requires the effective integration of migration into the overall policy framework for the sake of coherence, and to ensure that migration has positive outcomes both “here” and “there”.
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